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PARALLELED STORIES REVIVED 
SHOW TRIALS AND POPULAR FRONT POLICY IN HUNGARY∗ 
 
ISTVÁN ÖTVÖS 
 
 
“- Never cease to think. 
- Thinking is the greatest danger that threatens us. 
- We have been through much danger, too. 
- And many people have survived them. 
- Indeed, really many ones.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: This study analyzes the László Rajk trial and its afterlife until the post-1989 
transition. It illustrates that not only this trial, but also the memory of this prosecution was strictly 
regulated by official political directions. Moreover, the author emphasizes the direct connection 
between the Rajk trial and the changing idea of the popular front. If during the war, the Soviets 
and the European communist parties successfully followed the anti-fascist popular front strategy, 
the directives from Moscow changed in September 1947. Andrei Zhdanov’s idea of the two 
camps forced the satellite parties to change the popular front policy. Once the anti-fascist popular 
front strategy sank into oblivion, Rajk could be turned into an enemy and be sentenced to death, 
although he had been a prominent figure of the anti-fascist resistance. When the popular front 
strategy was revived in new form, Rajk and his fate became a historic topic. Following the 
debates around this topic, this study stresses that the Rajk trial was a very problematic issue for 
János Kádár, who had a personal responsibility for this death and thus directly influenced the 
remembrance of the trial. Once Hungary headed towards political pluralism, the Rajk case sunk 
into oblivion, for the reevaluation of Imre Nagy’s competing case emerged as the symbol of the 
break with the communist regime.  
Keywords: political transition; communist regime; popular front; resistance; opposition; 
political police; show trial; rehabilitation; memory.  
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1
  Aladár Horváth, a Hungarian writer who lived in Romania, quoted this conversation with 
Valter Roman, an old-timer of the underground Romanian Communist Party. Roman 
himself went through many political experiences. A volunteer in the Spanish civil war, 
then a refugee in the Soviet Union, he became after WWII a general in the Romanian 
Army with political, educational and propaganda-related responsibilities, but was marginalized 
after the redefinition of the popular front policy in Romania (Horváth 2006, 149.) 
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Show trials were an essential part of Hungarian political history after 
WWII, although Hungarian academic publications did not necessarily made that 
obvious. These postwar events are generally well known, but the associated 
backstage maneuvers, which followed political turns and in some cases even 
anticipated them, are much less researched. This author examines the 
relationship between show trials in Hungary and the changing communist 
politics, discusses the closely guarded remembrance of these events until 1989 
and highlights the politically supported narratives of the transition period. 
 
 
The Popular Front Policy in Hungary 
as a Communist Strategy of Legitimation 
 
After 1945, the Hungarian political elite changed entirely and the basis of 
legitimacy was radically transformed. The members of the new democratic 
government originated in the former opposition parties, while the former 
governing party disappeared and so did the extreme right. The parties in new 
democratic government had a more or less organized network and operated in a 
mass party framework. In these circumstances, the right wing of the former left 
– like the Smallholders’ Party – became the right of the new political spectrum, 
while the left was represented by two Marxist parties: the social democrats and 
the communists.2 
The international context and especially Hungary’s position as looser in 
WWII forced all parties to join a coalition. These coalitions were, however, 
strictly regulated by the agreements which were established during the war. The 
agreement between the Smallholder’s Party and the Social Democratic Party 
was set up in 1943. Yet, the latter had opened talks in September 1944 with the 
reorganized Hungarian Communist Party too. These two connections positioned 
the Social Democratic Party in the middle of the new Hungarian political life, as 
this organization served as the balance of the political changes. Nevertheless, 
the two agreements implied two different goals. From a political viewpoint, the 
agreement with the Smallholders’ Party meant the reestablishment of a western-
style democratic system, while the accord with the communists meant the 
imposition of the Soviet-type Marxist-Leninist ideals, as the two so-called 
workers’ parties acknowledged. In 1945, in the enthusiasm of renewal, the 
conflict between these opposite paths did not seem yet sharp. 
The members of the former opposition wanted to make clear the 
difference between them and the wartime regimes, so they demanded the 
punishment of war criminals. Such goal required the establishment of a new 
                                                          
2
  For more on the context in which the communist takeover took place in post-WWII 
Hungary, see Kenez (2009) and Mevius (2005). 
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type of political police in Hungary. Although it was the coalition government 
that founded this special police force, the leader of the organization became 
Gábor Péter, who was a veteran of the underground Communist Party since the 
war and a member of the Soviet espionage network. Accordingly, Péter 
successfully transformed this new police into the trusted instrument of the 
communists. At the end of the war, the Communist Party was one of the 
political organizations in the governmental coalition, but not the most powerful 
one. However, the communist leadership had ambitious goals in 1945. 
Nevertheless, the general election held in the autumn of that year showed 
another reality. The Communist Party could not reach its goal, for only 17 % of 
the voters elected them. In many electoral districts, the number of the votes did 
not even match the number of party members in 1945. 
The other pole of the postwar political elite came from the circles of the 
political resistance movement. In Hungary, this resistance emerged and grew in 
strength from the middle of the 1930s as an intellectual movement against the 
existing government, which asked for social reforms and moderate political 
changes. The members of this political resistance wanted more than a 
governmental change, but less than a regime change. When compared to the 
interwar ruling elite, the representatives of this resistance appeared as radical 
leftists, yet they were not communists. The structure of the opposition 
movement changed during the war. Until 19 March 1944, as long as Hungary 
remained a non-occupied country, the resistance movement was based on 
political actions by intellectuals. After the German Army occupied Hungary and 
especially after the collapse of the Horthy regime on 15 October 1944, the 
resistance movement shortly turned into an armed movement too. 
The postwar political elite originated to a large extent from this leftist 
intellectual movement. The political actors came from the resistance movement, 
but many of them were close to the new parties. All these actors imagined a new 
political framework based on a new concept of the popular front, although the 
participants were animated by different ideas and used different methods.3 The 
very idea of the popular front was not unfamiliar to the political thinking in 
Hungary, where such a front of the opposition had a political tradition from the 
interwar period. Then, the leftist opposition to the government tried to enforce a 
program of moderate reforms by using a sort of popular front. Organized in the 
1930s, the March Front – which published its program structured on twelve 
points on 15 March 1937 – envisaged the transformation of the welfare social 
system and the breaking away from the party politics.  
At the same time, there was another tradition of the popular front, which 
came from the Marxist left-wing movements. The political opposition formed 
                                                          
3
  Above all, the non-communist members of the movement did not want a “revolution,” but 
a democratic government including all democratic political organizations (Dezsényi 1964, 
121-122). 
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by Hungarian Marxists was not restricted to the communists. The so-called 
“official” Communist Party, which was a member of the Comintern, was a very 
small and disorganized group in the 1930s. The Central Committee could not 
maintain regular connections with the separate groups of the party after 1932. 
Moreover, many of the non-Comintern communist groups joined the afore-
mentioned popular front of the leftist opposition. Although their aim was totally 
different, the ”official” Communist Party followed the campaign of the other 
leftist groups and managed to organize eventually a camouflage organization, 
which could join the legal opposition movement easier. If the core of the 
communist strategy in the 1920s relied on the condemnation of cooperation 
with other parties, this situation changed by the beginning of the 1930s, once 
the western communist parties had successfully made use of the anti-fascist 
popular front strategy. The local communist leaders had realized even earlier the 
problems of this non-cooperative strategy devised by Moscow, but they had to 
comply with the rules of the Comintern.4 
The unsuccessful political tactics of rejecting party coalitions did not 
disturb the Soviets until new problems emerged in Western Europe. Although 
there is no agreement regarding which of the two problems seemed more 
dangerous to Stalin, Hitler’s takeover in Germany or the Spanish Civil War, the 
fact is that both emerged approximately at the same time and influenced the 
new front policy in the same way. Eventually Hitler proved to be the most 
dangerous, but in the mid 1930s the Spanish situation needed a more urgent 
response. The Spanish civil war appeared, on the one hand, as the perfect 
context to export the revolution, but on the other, this conflict anticipated the 
prospect of a general European war. If the panic of the revolution had spread 
across Europe, all countries would have joined the anti-communist alliance. 
In these circumstances, Stalin needed allies against the threat. Both 
military and political alliances were necessary, but these two aspects were 
interconnected. France could seem as a perfect military ally for him, but this 
country could not have been a trustful one. In Stalin’s mind, only a left-wing 
government in France could have guaranteed the alliance and make him sure of 
the friendship with this country. At the same time, the left-wing government 
could have protected the leftist parties, including the communists. However, the 
weakness of western European communist parties became quickly obvious and 
therefore Stalin changed the political strategy. In the 1930s, leftist so-called 
bourgeois parties became members in both the French and the Spanish Popular 
Fronts. In this context, the hidden goal of the communists was to coordinate and 
control all parties in the popular fronts. This new model of popular front 
                                                          
4
  The story of the 1928 local government election in Romania shows the typical attitude of 
the Comintern. When the Romanian communist leaders joined a popular-front-style 
opposition, they were stopped by the Comintern leaders from Vienna. 
PARALLELED STORIES REVIVED 
SHOW TRIALS AND POPULAR FRONT POLICY IN HUNGARY 
43
strategy was organized “from above” with the purpose of allowing the 
communists to take over the other parties and movements in these bloc coalitions. 
During WWII, yet another type of the popular front emerged. The 
prominent example of this type was to be found in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Contrary 
to the previous model, Tito’s front was built up “from below.” Tito could 
control his movement, which unified all members of the anti-German political 
groups. His followers were led by a high level of enthusiasm, while their 
practice was shaped by the military occupation of Yugoslavia. The Nazi 
hegemony caused the building up of popular fronts “from below” in every 
occupied European country. If somebody was not against the ambitions of the 
popular front, then it could join it given the level of tolerance regarding the political 
affiliation. More than others, the spectacular Yugoslav front was very operative 
on the battlefield. The other type of popular front “from below” was born in Poland 
during WWII. This political organization represented not only a powerful armed 
movement, but also a shadow society. Briefly put, these types of resistance 
movements were a special form of popular front policy during WWII. 
Turning back to postwar Hungary and its radically changed political 
situation, one should note the dissolution of the interwar party system due to the 
free or forced immigration of most members of the former political elite. The 
new parties which rebuilt political life came from the former opposition. The 
elite change was almost complete, for only some representatives of the former 
administrative bodies remained in local councils. The former opposition 
established the framework of the new government, which appeared again as a 
type of popular front. The character of this popular front was similar to that of 
the resistance movements, as the new structure of political life originated in the 
pre-WWII popular front “from below.” If during the wartime the enemy was 
obvious, once the war against the Nazis ended, the common enemy disappeared. 
Thus, the members of the Hungarian popular front had lost their cohesion. Yet, 
the post-WWII parties in the democratic coalition completely agreed on the 
need to destroy the former political structures, elites and institutions. 
Eventually, those unwilling to cooperate in the increasingly communist-
dominated political framework were forced into exile.  
Otherwise, the communists successfully cooperated after WWII with 
many non-communist members of the resistance movement. The eminent 
Hungarian left-oriented publisher Imre Cserépfalvi was a member of the 
editorial board of the communist newspaper Szabad Nép. Many other 
intellectuals moved into this direction, but Cserépfalvi could be indeed 
considered a typical representative of these so-called “fellow travelers.” 
Although no communist, he was nonetheless a member of the anti-Nazi 
intelligentsia and of a group which received in 1942 a letter from the British 
Special Operations Executive that shows he was reckoned, at least by some 
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political actors in Great Britain, as a notable leader of this anti-Nazi opposition.5 
These non-communist but anti-Nazi Hungarians really believed in the renewal 
of politics in their country in the sense of western-type democratization. They 
struggled for freedom and social justice and joined the communists for 
achieving this purpose, but discovered their hidden aims too late. 
As mentioned, the punishment of the former war criminals represented a 
major goal of, as well as a legitimizing tool for, the new political elite. When 
the postwar political system started to work, it appeared that the easiest and at 
the same time legal way of punishing the war criminals in Hungary was to 
follow the Nuremberg model. A first version of political police and new courts 
were established, so the Nazi supporters in Hungary were eliminated between 
1945 and 1949. However, there were disturbing issues from the beginning of 
these trials. The first victim of the new political police was an old-fashioned 
Hungarian Marxist, Pál Demény.6 His arrest in the spring of 1945 preceded that 
of the war criminals. As a veteran communist, Demény had much more 
influence in the labor movement than his newly enrolled comrades. His arrest 
represented an early warning that what was going on turned wrong, but few 
were able to detect it at that time. The newly appointed head of the political 
police Péter had first the task to purge the Communist Party and only then that 
to hunt for Nazis. In other words, his most important duty was to chase former 
comrades who had been formerly hunted by Horthy’s police.7  
A unified Hungarian Communist Party came into existence quickly due 
to the efforts of the comrades from the former underground movement. The new 
party members followed obediently the new leaders. These conditions offered 
the opportunity to destroy those parties which became right-wing, like the 
Smallholders’ Party, by using the political police when there was no other 
option, like in Demény’s case. Thus, a new chapter in the existence of the secret 
police began with the occurrence of the anti-Nazi trials. In the spring of 1946, a 
widespread investigation against local leaders was initiated in the Gyöngyös 
area. The targeted person became Pater Szaléz Kiss who was a very influential 
                                                          
5
  Letters from “Peter” to “Imre” (National Archives of Hungary HS 4/126). 
6
  Pál Demény (1901-1991) was a founding member of the Independent Young Workers’ 
Group in 1918, then entered the Communist Party of Hungary on 13 February 1919 and 
served in the Hungarian Red Army under the aegis of the Hungarian Republic of 
Councils. After August 1919, he led the Communist Youth Workers’ Organization, was 
arrested several times, and refused to be changed and transferred to the Soviet Union. 
After 1924, he led a fraction which broke away from the “official” Communist Party. As 
leader of a group of around 4000 individuals, which was renamed in late 1944 as the 
Communist Party of Hungary, he negotiated their merging with the Communist Party led 
by Rajk and Péter. He was arrested on the last day of the siege of Budapest by Gábor 
Péter, the head of the political police in the Rákosi era, sentenced in 1946, and then in 
1953, to prison and hard labor. He was released from prison on 13 October 1956 and 
rehabilitated in 1989 (Ötvös 2012, 234).  
7
  For Gábor Péter’s earlier life, see Gyarmati (2002, 25-79). 
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Franciscan monk in the local society. He was put in connection to the local 
leaders of the Smallholders’ Party and a group of its youth section. Although 
the archives do not contain real evidence, but only the statements of the 
executed persons, one could fairly assume that the investigation was conducted 
in such a way as to show that a wide-scale movement in the Gyöngyös area, 
which was supposedly controlled by the Smallholders’ Party and the Franciscan 
monk, envisaged the killing of Soviet soldiers. 
Although the Soviets heavily supported the Communist Party, the 
political struggle against the Smallholders’ Party came to a deadlock by the end 
of 1946. The leaders of the latter had demanded successfully the enforcement of 
the proportionality of parliamentary mandates in all the state institutions, 
including the political police. At the same time, the communists were 
unsuccessful in their effort to introduce the planned economy and the banning 
of compulsory religious education. In many ways, it was a stalemate. In this 
context, the communist leader Mátyás Rákosi turned to what seemed his last 
resort: his faithful political police. At the beginning of 1947, a new criminal 
procedure was staged against the Hungarian Brotherhood. This process ushered 
the elimination of communists’ main rivals from the Smallholders’ Party and 
the achievement of a majority in the parliament through new elections 
scheduled for September of 1947. In short, these political problems were solved 
not by political means, but by using the political police led by Péter. 
In the autumn of 1947, the communist world witnessed an important 
event with the meeting held in Sklarska Poręba, where the Cominform was 
born. Already before this, Rákosi had adopted the Hungarian style of popular 
front strategy characteristic to post-WWII Central Europe. At this time, his only 
task was to put into practice the Soviet goals. Accordingly, the right-wing 
parties were eventually disintegrated. However, the Cominform also imposed a 
new strategy to every communist leader in the satellite countries: the 
elimination of social-democracy. Nevertheless, the elimination of the social 
democrats was not an easy task, because this was a well-organized party which 
was supported by the working class and had more than fifty years of leftist 
political tradition. In this case, the tactic applied to members of other parties in 
the context of the anti-Nazi hunt was inefficient, for the social-democrats could 
not be plausibly portrayed as “fascists” or supporters of the “reaction.” Thus, in 
the spring of 1948, before the congress of the Social Democratic Party which 
eventually decided to merge with the communists, the newspaper headlines 
were full of news about social democrat leaders accused by the political police 
of high treason. Such messages eventually reached the public and allowed 
Rákosi accomplish the regime change in Hungary in the next year and a half. 
The communists reorganized the economy following the Soviet model of central 
planning based on state ownership and prepared the last great step of the 
takeover: the elections of 15 May 1949, which assured the total political 
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hegemony of the newly established, communist-dominated, Hungarian 
Independent People’s Front. With this, the majority of the Hungarian 
communists thought that the political power struggle had come to an end.  
 
 
The Renewed Popular Front and the Rajk Show Trial  
 
In this post-electoral context, the arrest of the former communist Minister 
of Interior László Rajk, who served until then his party faithfully, came as 
startling news. Many communists became confused, as the reason behind this 
arrest was nebulous. Indeed, the Rajk case involved a very complicate trial. Yet, 
two important elements were clear. The first aspect involves the relationship 
between the State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As head 
of this ministry, Rajk fought for the control of the political police. Theoretically, 
the minister of interior was the head of the State Security Service as well before 
1950. As documents in the National Archives of Hungary illustrate, the head of 
the political police Péter complained many times to Rákosi that the activity of 
the institution which he headed suffered because of Rajk, who thought it was 
his duty to check their work, including the reports that were sent to Moscow 
(MNL OL MK-S 276  f. 62/2). The struggle for mastery between Péter and Rajk 
was a long duel. In the summer of 1948, Rajk was ousted from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and appointed as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
communist authorities never revealed the reason of this change, but the 
subsequent show trial against Rajk illustrated that he recommended the moving 
of the files of the State Security Service to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.8 
Thus, Péter’s accusation that Rajk was an enemy was easier accepted. After his 
arrest in 1949, two members of the Political Committee interrogated Rajk: 
János Kádár and Mihály Farkas.9 During this interrogation, Farkas accused Rajk 
                                                          
8
  Official Report of the Session of the Interior Committee, 6 July 1948 (MNL OL MK-S 
276. f. 84/1).  
9
  János Kádár (1912-89) was born in Fiume as János Csermanek (name used until 1945). 
Between 1918 and 1929, he followed his studies in Budapest. After working in a 
typewriter factory for a year, he lost his job and entered the Communist Youth Workers 
Union. Arrested in 1931, he was released after a year without trial and kept under 
surveillance by the police. In 1933, he was arrested again and sentenced to two years of 
prison. In January 1934, the periodical Kommunista accused him as collaborator of the 
police and traitor. In 1937, he was again released from jail and joined the Social 
Democratic Party. In 1940, he acted as member of the reorganized Communist Party and 
since 1942 as member of the Secretariate of the Central Committe (CC). After the 
disolution of the Comintern in 1943, he disolved the Communist Party in Hungary and 
reorganized it as a wider popular movement under the name of Peace Party, a decision for 
which he was later to be punished for „liquiditatorism.” Caught by the German authorities 
on the border region with Yugoslavia in 1944, he was imprisoned in the Conti street 
Prison House, from where he was forced to march towards the western borders, but 
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of attempting at organizing a new intelligence unit in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. The motive behind the trial seemed to be Rajk’s initiative of extending 
attributions of his checking the activities of the intelligence units of the State 
Security Service (Varga 2001, 157-170). In reaction, Rákosi used initially 
political instruments and later political police procedures to eliminate Rajk, who 
was perceived by him as an inner “enemy” and a contester of his hegemonic 
position.  
However, the investigation was driven by a second reason too: for many 
veteran communists in Hungary, Rajk was a symbolic figure. In the early 1930s, 
when he joined the movement, the communists were persecuted by the police. 
Thus, Rajk and his comrades regarded themselves as heroes of the Marxist idea. 
At that time, the communists had also good connections with many non-
communist leftist intellectuals. The party followed the anti-fascist popular front 
strategy, which was the reason why Rajk was regarded as a partner by these 
non-communist intellectuals, who then left the country in 1949-50 (Fejtő 1990, 
106). Until this trial, the communist party still followed the same popular front 
policy and tried to build a wider social basis on that policy.10 In this way, they 
managed to attract many leftist intellectuals in their political machinery. There 
were already some signs of political change even before Rajk’s arrest, but these 
                                                                                                                                              
managed to flee, came back to Budapest and joined the resistance movement. In 1945, he 
was a member of the CC of the Communist Party, the second in command in the Budapest 
Police, an elected member of the Provisional National Assembly. Kádár also followed 
Rajk as head of the communist local party organs in Budapest. Between 1945 and 1948, 
he was deputy of the first secretary of the communist party, confirmed in this position in 
the Hungarian Workers’ Party (HWP) which resulted from the 1948 merge of the 
communists and social-democrats. Also in 1948, Kádár replaced Rajk as minister of 
internal affairs. Present at the interrogation of Rajk in 1949, he informed the leading 
bodies of the HWP about the stages of the trial. In 1950, he was replaced from his 
ministerail position and in 1951 was arrested and jailed for life, following a show-trial. He 
was nonetheless released on 22 July 1954, rehabilitated and appointed secretary of the 
HWP in the Therteeth Administrative Sector of Budapest and a year later of the Pest 
county. In March 1956, he was present at the inner party leadership meeting when Rákosi 
informed about the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
Kádár was reincluded in the central leading bodies of the HWP in July 1956 and, as well 
known, he replaced Ernő Gerő as first secretary of the HWP on 24 October 1956. Few 
days later, on 1 November 1956, after attending the Nagy government’s meeting, where 
the historic decisions about neutrality and leaving the Warsaw Pact Organization were 
made, he left for Moscow in secret. On 4 November 1956, Kádár arrived with the Soviet 
support in Szolnok, where he announced the establishment of a new workers’ and 
peasants’ government and made a radio statement in support of the Soviet Army’s brutal 
intervention against the Hungarian revolution and its leadership. Installed by the Soviets 
on 5 November 1956 as the leader of the reestablished communist regime, he began its 
long ruling with harsh reprisals against the participants in the revolution, including the 
execution of former Prime Minister Imre Nagy (Bihari 2005, 316-328). 
10
  According to János M Rainer’s considerations on „pillars” of the governmental 
philosophy of the Hungarian Communist Party in 1945. 
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signs could be clearly perceived only afterwards. In fact, Rajk’s fate showed 
everybody that the popular front policy was over. 
It was not by coincidence that in the next year the whole staff of the 
Hungarian army was replaced. Ii is also worth mentioning that György Pálffy, 
who had led the Hungarian Army’s Intelligence Service after WWII, was also 
arrested as part of the trial staged against Rajk in 1949. From Pálffy’s 
background, one can infer two issues which help one understand the logic of 
building show cases. First, Pálffy was among those who worked for the Soviet 
espionage.11 Many political leaders thought that the direct connection with 
Moscow would offer them protection, but in the summer of 1949 it became 
clear that this assumption was no longer valid. Pálffy’s case illustrates that 
Rákosi, once in control of the party and the state, also aimed at controlling the 
information passed on to the Soviet Union. Second, Pálffy and Rajk knew each 
other from before the war and both had been prominent members of the 
resistance. Rajk was a political leader of the communist group within this 
movement, while Pálffy as a military expert of it. By the time the Rajk trial 
begin unfolding, Rákosi had already reorganized the earlier version of popular 
front which was built on the heritage of the resistance movement and managed 
to marginalize in the new organization all those who had become in the 
meantime undesirable, like Rajk.  
Established on January 1949, the Hungarian Independent People’s Front 
had different political goals than the former popular front. Some key questions 
in this respect were clarified by an editorial article entitled “Democratic unity” 
and published in Szabad Nép on 30 January.12 Above all, this leading article 
emphasized that the former popular front was a mere anti-fascist organization 
with dubious membership: “It is an avowed fact that representatives of the 
imperialists, the plutocrats and the class of big landowners had been infiltrated 
the former popular front.” The reason for establishing a new popular front – 
continued the article – was the removal of these “enemies of the people.”13 In 
the Marxist-Leninist jargon, this expression usually referred to non-
communists. Unlike the previous version, the new popular front was led by the 
vanguard “party of the working class:” the communists. Rajk was a member of 
the National Board of the new popular front, but not its leader. The president of 
the organization became Rákosi, although Rajk was the very embodiment of the 
popular front policy for his comrades. The removal of Imre Nagy and László 
Rajk from their ministerial positions in the spring and summer of 1948 could 
                                                          
11
  When Pálffy was arrested, a transceiver was found on his flat. This was supposed to be 
the main evidence in the trial, but the Soviets asked few days later for his transceiver.  
12
  According to the program published in Szabad Nép, the new Popular Front replaced party 
rivalry (Szabad Nép 1949a: 1-2).  
13
  See also A Magyar Függetlenségi Népfront nyilatkozata (Declaration of the Hungarian 
Independence’s Popular Front) (Szabad Nép, 1949b: 1). 
PARALLELED STORIES REVIVED 
SHOW TRIALS AND POPULAR FRONT POLICY IN HUNGARY 
49
not have been an accident. Yet, Rákosi needed both for a little while. After the new 
elections held on 15 May 1949, this story has changed. Rákosi was in full control, 
so Rajk was quickly arrested, while Nagy only pushed into a corner. This timing is 
particularly important, for it represents evidence for our above mentioned assertion. 
 
 
The Afterlife of the Rajk Trail 
 
The satellite trials of the Rajk case were over by 1952. However, these 
trials were placed in 1953 again on the agenda with the reexamination of those 
cases which were staged as show trials. At that time, the political context had 
changed: Stalin had died and Imre Nagy had become prime minister. Obviously, 
the revision had many different political reasons. On the one hand, the Soviets 
required it, but on the other, Nagy acted out of personal conviction likewise. It 
can be hardly proved that the members of the Soviet State Security staff in 
Hungary involved in the Hungarian show trials disappeared from the scene due 
to these revisions. Yet, the rehabilitation was useful to the Soviets as well, 
because in this way they and their Hungarian comrades could confirm the 
removal of the Stalinists through the most appropriated documents. For the 
Soviets, the guiding principle was without question the political interest. 
However, Nagy’s interests were similar. He had probably the intention to rectify 
an act of injustice too, but the initiative behind the revision of the show trials 
did not actually belong to him. According to documents from the Archives of the 
Institute of Military History, the Military Prosecution made from August 1952 a 
proposal to review the convictions.14 This is not a matter of prime importance, 
but it illustrates that the Military Prosecution had initiated the mechanism of 
rehabilitation while Mátyás Rákosi and Mihály Farkas, at that time Minister of 
Defense, still held their official positions. In other words, the post-Stalinist 
changes of personnel in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers were not 
connected to the revision of the show trials, for those in charge had begun to 
elaborate the relevant procedures before Nagy became prime-minister in 1953. 
At that time, Rákosi had been in command of the party for many years, 
and Nagy knew well that he needed the support of the party in order to return in 
a leading position. As there was no political pluralism, one had to seek the 
support of the single existing party. In such context, the idea of the former 
                                                          
14
  Report on the realization of Order HM 0/4, 14 July 1952 (HIL MN 1952/T 807. d. 47. f.)  
Kispál Pál maj. prosecutor and Ónody György cap. political officer: „It was found that the 
Courts and Prosecutions made mistakes when they enforced the prohibition from public 
affairs as secondary/supplementary punishment. The attorney general’s office, willing to 
eliminate the mistakes, asked for revision in 182 cases judged by the Military Higher Court” 
(HIL MN 1952/T 807. d. 63 f. – 30 September 1952). After the report, a review was conducted 
and came to the conclusion that the act of accusation was based only on the confessions 
and the briefs. The remedies were ruled in October (HIL MN 1952/T 807. d. 65. f.) 
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victims of the Stalinist period to create a sort of “party within the party” seemed 
the only reasonable response (Sipos 2005, 227-260). That Nagy and others 
envisaged such a goal, it was all very clear to Rákosi. Thus, he maintained after 
1953 his leading position in the party and intended to control the reexamination 
of the show trials. Nagy’s interest was to accelerate and finish the revisions 
within a short time span, but Rákosi was against it and had the means of preventing 
this plan. Thus, the former was in a really difficult position. Tibor Méray, who 
became later Nagy’s supporter, considered his governmental program a sort of anti-
party manifestation, which was going on in the summer of 1953: “Everyone is 
working under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, as even the supporters 
failed to understand the situation. The prime minister had felt the consequences 
of not being assured of the party’s support, since he was trying to find new 
forums and to place his supporters in powerful positions. He had drummed up 
mass organizational support to renew the popular front policy” (Méray 2006). 
Nagy’s attempts did not live up to the expectations because he quickly 
remained powerless. In spite of displaying a collective leadership, Rákosi still 
dominated the party and the groups inside; he even controlled the government 
through his henchmen. Thus, he could manage to regain almost full control by 
the spring of 1954 (Ságvári 1989).Yet, this reestablishment could not be carried 
out completely, and this was the source of Rákosi’s hesitant policy in the 
following years 1954-55. In this context, Rákosi and his followers had to allow 
the reburial of Rajk on 6 October 1956 and showed in this way their indecision 
to confront the inner-party opposition. Consequently, one should not 
overestimate the importance of this reburial, although at that time seemed to 
suggest a renewal of the political situation. The process of rehabilitation focused 
only on the leftist political victims, first of all the communists and the former 
social democrats. This clearly illustrated the limits of Nagy’s policy. He should 
have forced for a wider base of the rehabilitation, which might have also 
assured him a better chance to maintain his governance. Only the social 
democrats benefited from this “new policy,” which did not apply to those so-
called bourgeois politicians, who had been in fact leftist during the war. They 
were excluded from the new popular front too. Thus, the rehabilitation did not 
refer to the Smallholders’ Party members or the people related to different 
religious denominations.15 It was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 that marked 
the end of the popular front. The revolution also cancelled everything related to 
the new policy, so the revision of the Rajk case was discontinued, in spite of the 
fact that his reburial, which was a public event of the rehabilitation process, was 
not directly connected to the revolution as such. The reburial was rather a 
symptom of Rákosi’s dwindling power.  
                                                          
15
  If the rehabilitation had happened exclusively on a legal basis, as it occurred after the 
political transition in 1989-90, that sort of restriction would have been impossible. 
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After 1956, the cohesion in the communist party increased, but because 
of the revolution, the popular front policy could not continue immediately. Yet, 
the popular front policy did reemerge in 1963, after Kádár stopped the reprisals. 
Then, both the Rajk trial and the popular front policy appeared again in public 
debates. After the revolution, Kádár used violence in order to reestablish order, 
but once that was achieved, Kádár needed to rebuild the cohesion of the party, 
just like Rákosi before him. As Talleyrand put it to Napoleon some two hundred 
years before, the Hungarian leader knew that he could not sit on bayonets. It is 
impossible to know if Kádár was indeed influenced by Talleyrand’s classic 
piece of advice, but he was nonetheless aware that it was impossible to force a 
society live with such internal tensions. Thus, he announced the well-known 
renewed formula of the popular front policy: “who is not against us is with us.” 
At the same time, Kádár was perfectly aware of the way his comrades in 
Moscow thought and too clever to risk. He had a great deal of experience, 
which taught him that every single communist politician who did not adhere to 
the absolute superiority of the party had failed. If not before, this was obvious to 
him at the time when he was released from jail in 1954. Consequently, he made 
sure that the popular front he proclaimed did not appear as an alternative 
political organization to the party, for the party remained for him the most 
important and the single framework of political activity.16  
The consolidation of Kádár’s power also required a new order. In this 
respect, resuming the revision of show trials in 1962 was a rather obvious 
choice. This sort of (re)solution was definitely not his aim, but there he changed 
his views after the investigative report on the role of the judicial authorities was 
finished.17 The report offered him an excellent occasion not only to expose the 
hardliners, but also to illustrate that he was a victim of Rákosi’s rule. Yet, the 
political circumstances asked for an ambivalent reexamination of the show 
trials. On the one hand, Kádár stood for this rehabilitation process because he 
needed the support of the former victims. On the other, he did not want to talk 
about Rajk’s trial, for comrades knew well his infamous role in this case. This 
ambivalence of the Kádár era toned down the idea of the popular front or the 
Rajk case in official discussions. Yet, a college (kollégium) of the Karl Marx 
Economic University took the name of László Rajk in 1970. Briefly put, one could 
freely discuss about Rajk’s death under Kádár’s rule, but not about his trial.18 
                                                          
16
  Kádár’s self-limiting behaviour was observed by Méray (2006, 50-51). 
17
  Összefoglaló a belügyi és igazságügyi szervek vezetői számára a volt államvédelmi és 
igazságügyi szervek szerepéről a személyi kultusz idején a munkásmozgalmi emberek 
ellen elkövetett törvénysértésekben. 14 november 1962. (Summary report for the leaders 
of judicial authorities about the role of the former state security and judicial authorities in 
the crimes against the participants of the labour movement in the period of the personality 
cult. 14 November 1962) (Horváth 1992, 675-733). 
18
 As an example, see Strassenreiter & Sipos (1974). This small book was the first publication 
about Rajk in many years. The authors of this book summed up the biography of Rajk, but 
refrained from analyzing the trial.  
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The Rajk’s story was put again on the agenda for the last time when the 
party entered in defensive in the late 1980s. When the communists started to 
prepare the transition, the younger leaders of the party understood they needed 
to build up a new profile of the movement. In order to achieve such a goal, there 
were only two possibilities of claiming legitimacy through political descend.  If 
they chose to rehabilitate Imre Nagy, who had became a martyr after the 
revolution of 1956, the party had to face Kádár’s responsibility for the reprisals. 
If they tried to build up a new myth around Rajk, his historical role in the communist 
takeover of power after WWII had to be revealed. In this dilemmatic context, many 
new documents and books about the Rajk trial came to be published (Zinner 
1988; Soltész 1989; Paizs 1989). It was due to these historical works that Rajk’s 
rehabilitation in the frame of the post-communist society was actually achieved. 
Yet, Rajk was a too committed and bellicose Bolshevik to be a representative of 
the “socialism with human face.” Nagy was a much more suitable character in 
this respect, but the attempt to use him also failed, although the revolution of 1956 
emerged by 1989 as the most important question related to the communist past. 
Before the transition, party leaders also tried to rethink the popular front 
policy. However, after the Soviet support disappeared, the Hungarian 
communist elite preferred to let the opposition movement grow and prepared for 
free elections. They imagined that after elections the new democratic parties 
could be their partners in a governing coalition, in case they would not be strong 
enough to govern the country alone. In the last two years of the communist era, 
many different types of a new popular front were imagined, but without any 
historical argument. In the frame of building a new, democratic political system, 
the last attempt to revitalize this strategy was in 1992, when the leftist 
opposition to the government led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
attempted to organize a popular front-type of movement. This movement 
supported the return of the Hungarian Socialist Party to governance in 1994. 
However, Rajk and Nagy were not important elements in this rethinking. The 
framework of political life has changed, and so were the ways past was recalled. 
To conclude, the Rajk case, including its afterlife, and the popular front 
regarded as a type of political thinking are parallel phenomena in the Hungarian 
(hi)story after 1945. Rajk case reappeared suddenly on the agenda whenever the 
party needed to renew the idea of the popular front in order to create new 
solidarities. The sinuous evolution of Rajk case not only mirrors the relations 
between the party and the popular front, but also illustrates the changing 
definitions of the latter in accordance with the policy promoted by the former. 
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